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Abstract
In perceptual decision-making, ideal decision-makers should bias their choices toward alternatives associated with larger
rewards, and the extent of the bias should decrease as stimulus sensitivity increases. When responses must be made at
different times after stimulus onset, stimulus sensitivity grows with time from zero to a final asymptotic level. Are decision
makers able to produce responses that are more biased if they are made soon after stimulus onset, but less biased if they
are made after more evidence has been accumulated? If so, how close to optimal can they come in doing this, and how
might their performance be achieved mechanistically? We report an experiment in which the payoff for each alternative is
indicated before stimulus onset. Processing time is controlled by a ‘‘go’’ cue occurring at different times post stimulus onset,
requiring a response within 250 msec. Reward bias does start high when processing time is short and decreases as
sensitivity increases, leveling off at a non-zero value. However, the degree of bias is sub-optimal for shorter processing
times. We present a mechanistic account of participants’ performance within the framework of the leaky competing
accumulator model [1], in which accumulators for each alternative accumulate noisy information subject to leakage and
mutual inhibition. The leveling off of accuracy is attributed to mutual inhibition between the accumulators, allowing the
accumulator that gathers the most evidence early in a trial to suppress the alternative. Three ways reward might affect
decision making in this framework are considered. One of the three, in which reward affects the starting point of the
evidence accumulation process, is consistent with the qualitative pattern of the observed reward bias effect, while the other
two are not. Incorporating this assumption into the leaky competing accumulator model, we are able to provide close
quantitative fits to individual participant data.
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Introduction
Imagine you are in a counter-terrorist fight. As a person
approaches, you have to quickly identity whether he is a friend or
foe and take an action: either you must protect him or kill him
before he kills you. The consequences are dramatic and different:
the cost is either your own life or your teammate’s. How well
would you do at making the right move? More specifically, how do
we integrate vague stimulus information, such as that person’s
body-figure, and the consequences of taking each of several
possible actions, under time pressure? Can we perform optimally
under such circumstances? If so, how is this achieved, and what
mechanisms might explain observed deviations from optimality?
The answers to these questions tell us more than just how well
people can do in such situations. They may also open a window to
the underlying mechanism of the interaction between bottom-up
stimulus information and higher-level factors such as payoffs.
How observers cope with stimulus uncertainty in decision-
making tasks has been intensively studied both experimentally and
theoretically [1–4]. Models ranging from abstract information
processing models to concrete neurophysiological models [1,2,5–7]
agree that the process involves an accumulation of noisy
information to drive a decision. However, there has been less
emphasis on the question: How do decision makers integrate
differential payoffs for responses to the different alternatives? This
issue has been explored extensively within the classical literature
on signal detection theory [8–10], where accuracy and bias
without regard to time taken to decide have been the prime
considerations. In a dynamic context, there were a few earlier
theoretical investigations (See [11,12] and other papers cited in
[12]), but there is only a small and very recent literature combining
experimental and computational investigations [12–15].
In our work we build on a theoretical analysis [14] of the
behavioral data from a recent study in non-human primates [15]
investigating the integration of reward and uncertain stimulus
information. This study employed a two-alternative forced-choice
task with random-dot motion stimuli varying in the percentage of
dots moving coherently in either of two directions. Monkeys were
trained to judge the motion direction, as in many earlier
experiments [3,16]. In addition, monkeys are informed before
motion onset of the amount of reward that would be available for
each correct choice (either one or two drops of juice). There was
then a 500 msec motion stimulus, followed by a delay of 350–
550 msec before the monkeys received a cue to respond. The key
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e16749behavioral results are shown in Figure 1A. When rewards are
balanced, probability of choosing one alternative increases with
motion coherence in that direction in a sigmoidal fashion
(coherence is treated as a signed quantity with positive numbers
representing motion in one direction, called the positive direction,
and negative numbers representing motion in the opposite
direction, called the negative direction), and is unaffected by the
magnitude of the reward. With unbalanced rewards, the sigmoid
curve shifts to the left or right, reflecting increased responses to the
alternative associated with the higher reward.
In their theoretical analysis of this behavioral data, Feng et.al.
[14] found that monkeys are almost optimal in their use of reward
information to bias their decisions about uncertain stimulus
information. We rely on signal detection theory [17] to capture
the pattern of results and to provide a grounding for the analysis of
the dynamics of reward processing explored in the present article
(our formulation is equivalent to the formulation offered by Feng.
et.al. [14] but slightly different in its formalization). In signal
detection theory, the presentation of a stimulus is thought to give
rise to a normally-distributed evidence variable. The mean value
of the evidence variable depends on the stimulus condition; the
value on a specific trial is thought to be distributed normally
around this mean. Feng et. al. [14] found that a good fit to the
data is obtained by treating the mean as linearly increasing with
the stimulus coherence, and the standard deviation of the
distributions as the same for all values of the coherence variable.
According to signal detection theory, the monkey makes a
decision by comparing the value of the evidence variable, here
called x, with a decision criterion h. From these assumptions, it
follows that the area to the right of h under the distribution
associated with each stimulus condition measures the probability
of positive choices for that stimulus condition. The effect of reward
is to shift the position of this criterion relative to the distributions of
evidence values, so that a greater fraction of trials contributing to
each distribution fall on the high reward side of the criterion (this
could also be achieved by a shift in the evidence variable in the
opposite direction). The shift in criterion results in a shift in the
sigmoidal curve relating response probability to stimulus coher-
ence, reflecting an increase in the probability of responses in the
direction of the more rewarded alternative. See panel B in
Figure 1.
Consider a specific pair of coherence values zC and {C,
represented by two Gaussian distributions with the same standard
deviation. The distance between the two distributions in the unit of
their standard deviation is known in signal detection theory as
sensitivity, and is called d’. Without loss of generality, we can shift
and scale the two distributions so that their midpoint falls at 0 and
each has standard deviation equal to 1. In this case their means fall
at zd’=2 and {d’=2 (Figure 2, panel A). The position of the
decision criterion, scaled to this normalized axis, represents the
degree of bias in units of the standard deviation [10]. Hereafter we
will call this the normalized decision criterion, and call it h’. Note that
the evidence variable x is also a normalized variable.
When payoffs are balanced, signal detection theory tells us that
an ideal decision maker should place the criterion at the
intersection of the two distributions, i.e. at 0 on the normalized
evidence axis. To see why, consider any point to the right of this
0 point. The height of the right-shifted curve indicates the
probability of observing this value of x when the motion is in
the positive direction p(xjP), while the height of the left-shifted
curve indicates the probability of observing this value of x when
the motion is in the negative direction p(xjN). When the two
directions of motion are equally likely (as in the experiments we
consider here), Bayes’ rule immediately tells us that we are more
likely to be correct if we choose the positive direction for all points
to the right of 0: p(Pjx)~p(xjP)=½p(xjP)zp(xjN)  is greater than
p(Njx)~p(xjN)=½p(xjP)zp(xjN) . Conversely, we will be more
likely to be correct if we choose the negative direction for all points
to the left of 0. This shows that the best placement of the decision
boundary is right at 0 in this situation; with any other placement
our choices would have a lower overall probability of being
correct.
When the payoffs are unbalanced, we assume the participant is
seeking to maximize the expected reward. The expected value of
Figure 1. Choice behavior with unbalanced rewards and an account in signal detection theory. A: Response probabilities in a perceptual
decision-making task [14] with reward manipulations. Data from one of two monkeys in [14] have been replotted with permission from the authors.
Percentage of positive direction choices (denoted T1 in the figure) increases with motion coherence in the positive direction in a sigmoidal fashion;
one direction of motion is nominally defined as positive, the other as negative. Black: balanced reward condition; Green: reward is higher in the
positive direction; Red: reward is higher in the negative direction. Dots represent data in [14] and solid curves represent fits based on signal detection
theory (SDT) as depicted in panel B. B: a characterization of this choice behavior based on SDT. Gaussian functions in different colors indicate the
distribution of the evidence variable x arising in each of the different coherence conditions. Vertical lines indicate the relative positions of the
decision criterion. Black, green and red vertical lines represent the criterion positions for the balanced, positive, and negative reward conditions
respectively. The area to the right of a specific criterion under a specific distribution corresponds to the percentage of positive choices in that reward
and coherence condition. As examples, the areas associated with balanced reward, and coherences~+6% (blue curves) are shaded.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g001
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times the reward value of this response. The relative expected
value of the two alternatives at each value of x can be illustrated
graphically by scaling the distribution functions. We illustrate this
in Figure 2A for the case where the reward for a response in the
positive direction is twice as large as the reward for a response in
the negative direction.
With this scaling included in the heights of the curves, these
heights now represent the relative expected value of the positive or
negative choice for each value of the normalized evidence variable
x. These heights tell us, for example, that if the value of the
evidence variable sampled on a particular trial falls right at 0, the
expected reward will be maximized by choosing the positive
response, because the height of the right-hand curve is higher at
this point than the height of the left-hand curve. As before, the best
choice of the placement of the criterion is to put it at the place
where the curves intersect. To the left of this point, the expected
payoff is greater for the negative direction; to the right of this point
it is greater for the positive direction. As can be seen, this means
that the optimal placement of the criterion is shifted to the left,
producing an increase in the proportions of the area under the
curve to the right of the criterion under both the positive and the
negative distributions.
Now we can visualize how the optimal decision criterion is
affected by sensitivity. When stimulus sensitivity is low (Figure 2B),
the crossing-point of the two curves is shifted further to the left.
Indeed, in the extreme case where sensitivity is zero, the expected
value is always greater for the higher reward alternative, and so the
optimal policy is to always choose the higher reward alternative.
On the other hand, when the stimulus sensitivity is very high, the
optimal shift becomes very small. The farther apart the two
distributions are, the closer to zero is the point where the
distributions cross. In fact it is easy to show that the optimal
criterion position is inversely proportional to sensitivity:
h’ opt~{
logRR
d’
, ð1Þ
where RR is reward ratio, R1=R2.
When multiple stimulus levels are used and randomized in an
experiment, the optimal criterion placement depends on exactly
the same logic already developed, but is made more complicated
by the fact that the stimuli associated with motion in the positive
direction now come from several different distributions rather than
just a single distribution. The probability of observing a particular
evidence value when the direction was positive is the sum of the
probability of observing the value under each of the distributions
associated with the different positive stimulus levels, normalized to
sum to 1; and similarly for the negative direction. For simplicity,
the standard deviations of the distributions are all taken to be the
same, and the means are assumed to be symmetrically distributed
around the 0 point of the evidence dimension x. Within these
constraints, we can then compute the optimal decision criterion,
by locating the position of the intersection of the summed
distribution functions scaled by the corresponding reward values
(Figure 2C), and compare it with the bias observed in each
participant’s performance to see how close the decision maker
comes to being optimal. The Figure gives an example of what the
distributions of values of the evidence variable might look like for
three positive and three negative stimulus levels whose means are
spaced proportionally to the spacing of the physical stimuli used in
our experiment.Note that the actual spacing can be determined
empirically, and need not be proportional to the physical spacing;
remarkably, however, the sensitivity data as shown in [14] are
consistent with proportional spacing, and the same holds for the
data from the present experiment.
The human and animal psychophysical literature on reward
bias [8–10] indicates that task details can have a huge impact on
measures of bias, and that, in some tasks at least, there are large
individual differences between participants. It is all the more
remarkable, therefore, that the data reported in Feng et. al. shows
a high level of consistency across the two animals, and follows a
simple pattern, consistent with a single criterion value for each
level of relative reward across all levels of stimulus difficulty. This
pattern is consistent with a statement in MacMillan and Creelman
[10] that a constant criterion is most likely to be observed when
stimuli differing in sensitivity are intermixed, and participants
cannot easily discern the relative difficulty level of the stimulus on
each trial [18].
Feng et.al. found that for both monkeys, the magnitude of the
criterion shift due to the reward manipulation is approximately
optimal given the range of stimuli used and their sensitivity to
them, deviating very slightly in the over-biased direction for both
of the monkeys in the experiment. Once again, this is a simpler
Figure 2. Optimal reward bias for relatively high (panel A), low (B) and combined (C) stimulus levels. A and B: When there is only one
stimulus level, the optimal decision criterion is at the point where the distributions intersect after scaling their relative heights by the corresponding
reward amounts. The amount of reward bias is smaller when the sensitivity is higher (panel A), and greater when the sensitivity is lower (panel B). C:
When multiple stimulus levels are employed, the optimal criterion lies at the intersection of the summed distributions multiplied by the
corresponding reward amounts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g002
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studies [8,9]. Task variables such as strength of motivation to
maximize reward and the provision of accuracy feedback on a
trial-by-trial basis may well contribute to the simplicity and clarity
of the reward effect in the data reported in Feng et. al.
The results of the analysis in Feng et. al. are encouraging from
the point of view of indicating that participants can perform close
to optimally under fixed timing conditions, at least under certain
task conditions. However, these results leave open questions about
whether or to what extent observers can achieve optimality when
the time available for stimulus processing varies, so that on
different trials participants must respond based on different
amounts of accumulated information. This question is important
for decision-making in many real-world situations, where the time
available for decision-making is not necessarily under the control
of the observer, and thus may have to be based on incomplete
evidence accumulation. Also, the behavioral results do not strongly
constrain possible mechanistic accounts of how observers achieve
the near optimal bias they exhibit, as part of a process that unfolds
in real time. Indeed, Feng et. al. were able to suggest a number of
different possible underlying process variants that could have given
rise to the observed results. These issues are the focus of the
current investigation.
The empirical question at the heart of our investigation is this:
How does a difference in reward magnitude associated with each
of two alternatives manifest itself in choice performance when
observers are required to make a decision at different times after
stimulus onset, including both very short and much longer times?
We investigate this matter using a procedure often called the
response signal procedure, in which participants are required to
respond within a very brief time (250 msec) after the presentation
of a ‘‘go’’ cue or response signal. Previous studies using this
procedure [1,19,20] have shown that stimulus sensitivity builds up
with time according to a shifted exponential function. That is,
when stimulus duration is less than a certain critical time t0,
stimulus sensitivity is equal to 0. As stimulus duration lengthens
beyond this critical time, sensitivity grows rapidly at first, then
levels off. Under these conditions, we ask how effectively
participants are able to use differential payoff contingencies. Are
participants able to optimize their performance, so that their
responses at different times reflect the optimal degree of reward
bias? Several delays are used ranging from 0 to 2 seconds, a time
past the point at which participants’ performance levels off.
Intuitively, (and according to the analysis given above) with zero
stimulus sensitivity, at very short delays, an ideal decision maker
should always choose the higher reward alternative. As stimulus
sensitivity builds up, reward bias should decrease, and level off in
an predictable way. Do decision makers achieve optimality when
forced to respond at different times after stimulus onset? If not, in
what way do they deviate from optimality?
Using the response signal method, we will see that sensitivity
grows with stimulus processing time, following a delayed exponen-
tial function, consistent with previous studies. We also find that the
reward bias, as measured by the position of the criterion h’, is larger
for short stimulus duration and becomes smaller as processing time
increases. Although weaker, the reward bias effect is still present
even for the longest times, after performance has leveled off.
Consistent with [14], we find participants are close to optimal for
long processing times, although slightly under-biased unlike the
monkeys. For short processing times, however, where stimulus
sensitivity is zero, participants are considerably under-biased.
A failure of optimality such as the one we will report invites the
question: How can we explain the actual observed pattern of
behavior? We explore this question within the context of the leaky
competing accumulator (LCA) model [1]. This model is one of a
broad class of accumulator models of decision-making (See [4] for
a review), incorporating leakage or decay of accumulated informa-
tion, as well as competition among accumulators, factors moti-
vated both by behavioral and neurophysiological considerations,
in the context of a stochastic information integration process. We
discuss the behavioral motivation below. Here we briefly note that
leakage (or decay) of the state of neural activity and inhibition
among populations of neurons are both characteristics of the
dynamics of neural processing, and these characteristics were
among the key motivating factors behind the development of this
model. The model is situated between abstract drift diffusion
models [2,5] and more neurophysiologically realistic models [6,7].
The presence of inhibition and leakage extend the model beyond
the classical drift-diffusion model, though it can be reduced to that
model as a special case. Its relative simplicity compared to the
more detailed physiological models gives it an advantage in
simulation and mathematical analysis. Indeed, the behavioral
predictions of the LCA model can be well-approximated under a
range of conditions by an even simpler one-dimensional dynamical
system called the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process [1,4,21],
which allows analytical predictions of choice behavior which, we
will argue below, increases our insight and facilitates fitting the
model to experimental data.
In the LCA model, separate accumulators are proposed for each
of the alternative choices available to the decision maker. The
accumulators are assigned initial activation values before accu-
mulation begins. At each time step of the accumulation process, a
noisy sample of stimulus information is added to each accumu-
lator; the accumulated activation of each accumulator is subject to
leakage, or decay back towards an activation of 0, and also to
inhibition from all other accumulators. When applied to
experiments such as ours, in which a response must be made to
a go signal that can come at different times after stimulus onset,
the LCA assumes that choice goes to the accumulator with the
highest activation value at the moment the decision must be made
[1]. When there are two accumulators in the model, choosing the
one with the largest activation is equivalent to basing the choice on
the difference in activation between the two accumulators: We
choose response 1 if the difference is positive, and response 2
otherwise. Because of noise in the evidence accumulation process,
this difference variable closely approximates the characteristics of
the evidence variable postulated in Signal Detection Theory.
Thus, the LCA modeling framework allows us to explore different
ways in which reward and stimulus information might be
integrated into the decision-making process in real time.
One of the key behavioral motivations for the LCA model was
to explain why performance levels off in perceptual decision-
making tasks with longer processing times. In the absence of leak
or inhibition, the integration of noisy information allows accuracy
(measured in d’) to grow without bound: as accumulation
continues, more and more noisy information is accumulated and
even a very weak signal will eventually dominate noise. With
leakage and/or inhibition, however, sensitivity tends to level off,
unless leakage and inhibition are in a perfect balance. When there
is an imbalance, performance asymptotes at a level reflecting the
degree of imbalance (as well as the strength of the stimulus
information), in accordance with the pattern seen in behavioral
experiments [1]. Intuitively, with leakage only, older information
decays away, preventing perfect integration. Inhibition can
counteract the leakage, but if inhibition becomes stronger than
leak, early information feeds back through the inhibition and tends
to overmatch the influence of later information. We will discuss
these points in more detail when we develop the model formally.
Integration of Reward and Stimulus Information
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leak- and inhibition-dominance, several experiments have now
been reported assessing participant’s sensitivity to early vs late
information. Under conditions like those we use in the present
study, in which participants must respond promptly to the
occurrence of a go cue, early information tends to be more
important than late [22,23]. Within our framework, this finding is
consistent with inhibition dominance, though the authors of [22]
prefer an alternative interpretation. With this guidance from other
work, we ground our consideration of the mechanism underlying
reward effects within the inhibition-dominant regime of the LCA
framework, henceforth denoted LCAi.
Using this framework, we test the following hypotheses about
the way in which reward information might influence the decision-
making process: HOI: Reward acts as a source of ongoing input that
affects the accumulators in the same way as the stimulus
information, thereby affecting which accumulator has the largest
value at the moment of the decision. HIC: Reward offsets the initial
condition of the process; it is not maintained as an ongoing input to
the accumulators, but it sets the initial state and can therefore
influence how the process unfolds. HFO: Reward does not enter
the dynamics of the information integration process at all, but only
introduces a fixed offset favoring the accumulator associated with
the higher reward. Under both HOI and HIC, reward input
favoring one accumulator will affect the dynamics of the activation
process. In contrast, under HFO, reward does not affect the
accumulation dynamics, but only comes into play at the time the
choice is made.
Although not exhaustive, these hypotheses encompass three
natural ways reward information might enter the decision process.
The first two hypotheses were considered in [14], but could not be
discriminated; the third one could also have been used to model
the monkey behavioral data. The fact that the decision occurred at
an approximately fixed time after stimulus onset prevented that
experiment from discriminating among these three possibilities.
However, the analysis of the neurophysiological data from the
same experiment, reported in [15], did provide relevant
information: The data provided no support for the idea that
reward produced an ongoing input into the accumulators (HOI),
but did provide direct support for the idea that reward affected the
initial activation of accumulators at the time stimulus information
began to accumulate (HIC). Modeling work reported in that paper
indicated that such an offset in the starting activation of the
accumulators was sufficient to account both for the physiological
data and the behavioral data reported in the paper, without the
need to also introduce a shift in the decision criterion (HFO).Our
theoretical analysis will show that the three hypotheses make
distinct predictions about the qualitative changes we should see
over time in the magnitude of the effect of reward bias. Thus, as
we shall see, our experimental data can be used to provide both a
qualitative and a quantitative assessment of the adequacy of each
of the three alternative accounts of the possible role of reward in
the dynamics of processing within the inhibition dominant leaky
competing accumulator model.
Issues similar to the ones we investigate here have also
previously been explored in two recent studies [12,13]. In these
studies, participants were required to decide whether two
horizontal lines presented to the left and right of fixation were
the same or different in length, under different deadline and payoff
conditions; as in [15] and in the studies we will report, information
about payoffs was presented in advance of the presentation of the
stimulus display. In the first of these papers [12], there was a
consideration of optimality, and both papers considered a range of
possible models that bear similarities to the set of models
considered here. These studies provide important information
relevant to the questions we address here. In particular, these
studies found no support for models in which the reward acts as a
source of ongoing input to the accumulators, and favored a model
in which processing of reward information preceded, and set the
initial state, of an evidence variable prior to the start of processing
stimulus information. However, in their framework, which does
not include either leakage or inhibition, a shift in starting place is
indistinguishable from a change in decision criterion. Thus, their
analysis does not distinguish between our HIC and HFO (we will
return to a consideration of the models in these papers in the
Discussion section). Furthermore, the best model they considered,
while far better than the others, still left room for improvement in
the fit to the data. Thus, it is of considerable interest to explore
whether our framework, which includes processes these studies did
not consider (specifically, leakage and inhibition), can provide an
adequate fit to data from a similar task, and whether the
mechanisms offered by our model allow a distinction to be made
between HIC and HFO. Additionally, it is worth noting two ways in
which our study extends the empirical base on which to test model
predictions about the time course of reward effects on decision-
making. First, our study spans a larger range of processing times,
encompassing very short as well as longer times, at which stimulus
sensitivity reaches asymptotic levels; and second, each participant
in our study completed a substantially larger number of experi-
mental trials, allowing us to assess the adequacy of alternative
models to fit individual participant data.
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that there are
alternatives to the LCAi model that could be used to explain some
of the important aspects of the data we will report, including the
leveling off of accuracy in time-controlled tasks and the relatively
greater importance of early- compared with late-arriving infor-
mation in [2,22,24]. Most basically, the leveling off can be
explained if there is trial to trial variability in the stimulus
information reaching the accumulators [2]. This could either arise
because the stimuli themselves vary from trial to trial or because of
variation from trial to trial in the output of lower-level stimulus
processing processes. In either case, an experimenter’s nominal
stimulus condition can actually encompass a normally distributed
range of effective stimulus values. In this situation, the lossless
integration of the classical DDM can eventually achieve a perfect
representation of the trial-specific value, but if the distribution of
values for different nominal stimulus conditions overlaps, asymp-
totic sensitivity will remain imperfect. Another way to explain why
performance levels off at longer trial durations is to propose that
participants do not continue integrating information throughout
the entire duration of the trial. Although the response signal
method in principle allows participants to continue integrating
until the go cue occurs, several authors have proposed that
integration may stop when the accumulated evidence reaches a
criterial level, even though further integration could result in
further improvements in accuracy [22]. With one or both of these
extensions of the basic drift-diffusion mechanism it has often been
possible to capture the patterns in time controlled data quite well
without invoking the leakage or inhibition features of the LCAi.
Thus, we offer the analysis we will present here as one possible
account for the findings from the present study, though possibly
not the only one. We do consider some alternative models in the
general discussion and the dataset from our investigation is
available for others to use in considering alternative accounts. The
data set is available at: http://www.stanford.edu/group/pdplab/
projects/GaoEtAlDynamicIntegrationData/.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Our experiment
design is described in Methods. The Results section contains the
Integration of Reward and Stimulus Information
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stimulus sensitivity and reward bias at different times, comparing
this with what would be optimal given the corresponding
sensitivity. In a third section on Dynamic Models, we apply the
LCA model to test our three hypotheses about how reward affects
the decision-making progress. Finally we return to the broader
issues in the Discussion.
Results
Basic Findings
To focus analysis on the effect of reward, we collapse across left
and right sides and present results in terms of choices toward the
higher reward alternative. There are hence six stimulus conditions
(three amounts of shift towards the higher reward, and three shift
amounts toward the lower reward) and ten delay conditions,
amounting to sixty combinations. Our observations are summa-
rized in Figure 3. For each combination, we plotted the percentage
of choices towards the higher reward vs the mean response time for
trials in the specified condition. Response time is defined as the
time from stimulus onset to a response, equal to the sum of the go-
cue delay plus the time to respond from the go-cue delay to the
actual occurrence of the response. Lines with filled symbols
represent congruent conditions in which stimulus and reward
favor the same direction, while lines with open symbols are used
for incongruent conditions where stimulus and reward favor
opposite directions. For congruent conditions, the probability of
choosing the higher reward corresponds to accuracy (proportion
correct). For incongruent conditions, proportion correct is 1 minus
the probability of choosing the higher reward.
As in a previous study using a similar method (Experiment 1 in
[1]), participants responded promptly to the go cue overall, though
all participants’ responses were slower when the go cue delay was
shorter. This can be seen by measuring the distance along the x
axis from the go cue delay value (successive vertical lines on the
figure, starting at 0) to the corresponding data point in the figure.
For the shortest go cue delay, participants missed the response
deadline 20% to 75% of the time. Rate of missing the deadline
declined rapidly at first then leveled off at longer go cue delays. In
the longest delay conditions participants missed the deadline 2% to
10% of the time.
All participants’ performance, except that of SL, shares the
following features: 1) the overall probability of choosing the higher
reward, roughly indicated by the mean position of all the curves, is
larger for short delay conditions and remains above 0:5 for all
delay conditions; 2) The curves for all stimulus conditions all fall
on top of each other for the shortest delay condition, indicating
zero stimulus sensitivity; 3) Although the responses are completely
insensitive to the stimulus at shortest delays, participants do not
always choose the higher reward alternative; 4) The curves diverge
as processing time increases, tending to level off at long durations.
For participant SL, although the curves do diverge as processing
time increases, and level off at long durations, there is little or no
indication of a bias toward the higher reward, with the possible
exception of a very slight deflection in the direction of higher
reward for responses in short delay conditions.
Extracting Sensitivity and Criterion Placement By Delay
Condition
The previous section qualitatively answered some of the
questions raised in the Introduction: Most participants do exhibit
a gradual reduction in the magnitude of the reward bias. To
quantify how they deviate from optimality and to motivate
dynamic models, we measured their stimulus sensitivity and
reward bias separately according to the Signal Detection Theory
analysis described in the Introduction. For each delay condition,
we calculated three sensitivities d’
i,i~1,2,3 for the three stimulus
levels and one value for the normalized decision variable, h’,a s
discussed in the introduction, choosing values that maximize the
probability of the data for that delay condition. It should be noted
that the adequacy of such an analysis even as a descriptive
characterization of the data is not guaranteed, as discussed in the
introduction. We assessed this using a graphical method discussed
in [10], together with Chi square tests. The results of this analysis
are presented in Supporting Information S1. The conclusion from
this analysis is that, indeed, the three d’
i values and single h’ value
provide a good empirical description of the data; as in [14], it
appears that participants did not adapt their criterion placement as
a function of the stimulus difficulty level, as expected when
stimulus difficulty varies unpredictably from trial to trial, as it does
in our experiment [10,18].
Stimulus Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity values as a function of time are shown in Figure 4
(symbols). Apparently stimulus sensitivity grows with stimulus
duration initially and then levels off for all participants. To further
demonstrate that the sensitivity observed is consistent with the
shifted exponential function as in previous studies [1,19,20], we
then carried out a maximum likelihood fit assuming sensitivity
follows a delayed exponential function
d’ t ðÞ ~D’ i 1{e{
t{t0
t
  
: ð2Þ
where D
0
i,i~1,2,3 denotes the asymptotic sensitivity levels for the
three stimulus conditions, t0 denotes the initial period of time
Figure 3. Results of our perceptual decision-making task with
unequal payoffs. For each combination of stimulus and delay
conditions, the percentage of choices towards higher reward (ordinate)
is plotted against the mean response time, the time from the stimulus
onset (time 0) to a response (abscissa). Lines with filled symbols denote
congruent conditions in which stimulus and reward favor the same
direction, lines with open symbols denote incongruent conditions in
which stimulus and reward favor opposite directions. Task difficulty is
color coded: Red, green and blue for high, intermediate and low
discriminability levels respectively. Dashed vertical lines indicate the
time of the ‘‘go’’ cue: 0–2000 msec after the stimulus onset.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g003
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the timescale of the dynamics of the stimulus sensitivity. The fitting
results are summarized in Figure 4 (solid curves) and the fitted
parameters are summarized in Table 1. The close match between
thesolidcurvesandthesymbolsinFigure4suggeststhatthestimulus
dynamics in this experiment is well-captured by the delayed
exponential function. We emphasize that sensitivity measures the
distance between the centers of the distributions in the unit of their
standard deviation, and both the mean and the standard deviation of
the activation can change over time. Indeed, both variables change
in the models we explore in the Dynamical Models section.
Our experiment employs a simple static visual stimulus, unlike
the dynamic motion stimuli used in many primate studies of the
dynamics of decision making. Interestingly, however, the time-
course of the accumulation of evidence is comparable in our study
and the similar study of Kiani et. al. [22], in which standard
dynamic motion stimuli are used; in both cases, a time constant on
the order of 1/3 of a second appears typical (for one of our
participants, the time constant is even longer). This may seem
surprising, since in the motion studies evidence must necessarily be
integrated over time due to the intrinsic noise of the stimuli,
whereas in our study, there is no intrinsic noise in the stimulus. We
cannot say, however, whether processing noise arising from micro-
saccades or neural sources, or some processing time constant
somewhat independent of the noise level, is governing the
relatively long time constant seen in our experiment.
An additional finding that emerges from this analysis is that the
asymptotic sensitivity D
0
i scales approximately linearly with the
stimulus level in this study. See Figure 5 for the linear fitting results
assuming:
D
0
i~kS ð3Þ
where S represents stimulus level taking values 1,3,5 and k is a
linear scalar.
Reward Bias
The measured normalized decision criterion, h’, for each delay
condition is depicted in Figure 6 (open circles connected with
dashed lines). As previously noted, this variable changes in the
expected way for all participants except SL, whose behavior is
unaffected by the reward manipulation.For each of the remaining
participants, we calculated the optimal decision criterion, h’ opt,
based on the signal detection theoretic analysis presented in the
introduction and the observed sensitivity data presented in the
preceding section, and plotted these optimal values in Figure 6
(solid curves) together with the normalized criterion value h’
estimated from the data as described above. Note that h’ opt~?
when d’ is equal to 0; for display purposes, such values are plotted
at an ordinate value of 3.0.
In the calculation of the stimulus sensitivity and the reward bias,
di’,i~1,2,3 and h’, we assumed the distributions of the evidence
variables for the three stimulus levels have the same standard
deviation: higher sensitivity, associated with higher stimulus levels,
results from distributions that are farther apart. However, the
increase in sensitivity could result from changes in the standard
deviation, as well as the separation of the distributions. Does the
finding that participants are underbiased depend on the
assumption that the standard deviations are equal? We considered
Figure 4. Stimulus sensitivity follows a shifted exponential
approach to asymptote as processing time increases. Colors
code the three discriminability levels: red, green and blue for 5,3 and 1
pixel(s) difference respectively. Symbols denote data (see text for
details) and solid curves denote the delayed exponential fit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g004
Table 1. Parameters for the delayed exponential fitting.
Participant t t0 D’ 1 D’ 2 D’ 3
CM 0.23 0.34 0.46 1.3 2.3
JA 0.45 0.27 0.66 2.0 3.2
MJ 0.16 0.34 0.53 1.4 2.3
ZA 0.20 0.32 0.76 2.1 3.2
SL 0.29 0.34 0.35 1.1 1.9
Parameters of the delayed exponential fitting according to signal detection
theory. Results for the five participants are shown in five rows. t,t0 and D’
denote the timescale, the delay and the asymptotic value of the delayed
exponential function respectively. Subscripts 1,2,3 refer to the three stimulus
levels. See Equation (2). The fitting result is depicted in Figure 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.t001
Figure 5. Asymptotic sensitivity scales approximately linearly
with stimulus level. Symbols denote the asymptotic sensitivity as in
Figure 4 and Table 1; Solid lines denote the linear fit constrained to
go through the origin. Fitted values of the scalar k are 0:45,
0:64,0:46,0:66,0:38 respectively for participants CM, JA, MJ, ZA
and SL.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g005
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different stimulus levels resulted only from a reduced standard
deviation, rather than increased separation of the distribution. In
this case as well all four participants actual bias came out below
what would be optimal; as with the equal standard deviation case,
the deviation was larger for short delays and smaller for long
delays (results now shown).
To assess the cost of participant’s deviations from optimality, we
calculated their reward harvest rates: the number of points they
obtained relative to the number they could have harvested had they
chosen the criterion optimally based on their stimulus sensitivity at
each time point. As with the monkeys in [14], all four participants
harvested more than 98% of the points for long delay conditions.
For the two longest delay conditions their harvest rates are:
99:9%,99:2%,98:9%,99:9%. However, for the two shortest delay
conditions, the rates are 93:2%,93:3%,87:9%,96:3% indicating that
they are considerably under-biased under these conditions. We
consider possible reasons for this underbias in the Discussion.
Dynamical Models
Motivated by the dynamics of the stimulus sensitivity and
reward bias, we now explore a possible mechanism underlying the
effect of reward on the decision-making process within the context
of the leaky competing accumulator (LCA) model. We review the
LCA model first and then implement and test the three hypotheses
raised in the Introduction. This leads to several alternative accounts
of the underbiasing of performance on trials at short delays.
The Leaky Competing Accumulator Model and Its One-
Dimensional Reduction
In the leaky competing accumulator model, noisy evidence for
each alternative is accumulated over time in each accumulator.
The accumulators compete with each other through mutual
inhibition, and the accumulated evidence in each is subject to
‘‘leakage’’ or decay. To model our experiment in which
participants have to respond promptly after a go cue, we assume
that the go cue triggers a comparison of the activation of the two
accumulators, and the response associated with the highest value is
emitted, subject to a possible offset as discussed below. For our case
with two alternatives, the accumulation dynamics is described by
dy1~({cy1{bf z½y2 zI1)dtz^ e edv1, ð4Þ
dy2~({cy2{bf z½y1 zI2)dtz^ e edv2; ð5Þ
where y1,y2 represent the activations of the accumulators, c,b are
leak and inhibition strengths respectively, I1,I2 are stimulus inputs
to the two accumulators, dv1,dv2 denote independent white noise
with strength ^ e e, and f z½:  is a nonlinear input-output function
arising from the neural inspiration for the model. A neuron does
not send outputs to other neurons when its activation goes below a
certain level; above this level, its output can be approximated with a
linear function of its activation. Motivated by this fact, we follow
[1,25] in using the threshold linear function. The value of the
function f z½:  is equal to its argument when the argument is above
zero, but is equal to zero when the argument is below zero.
By convention, we treat alternative 1 as the positive alternative
(associated with the high reward), and alternative 2 as the negative
alternative (associated with the low reward). The assumption that
the participant chooses the response associated with the accumu-
lator with the largest activation is equivalent to the assumption
that the choice is determined by the sign of the activity difference
y~y1{y2 at the moment the accumulators are interrogated. If
yw0(y1wy2), the positive alternative is chosen, otherwise the
negative alternative is chosen. Therefore, we only need to track the
difference between the two accumulators y, hereafter referred to as
the activation difference variable. Note that this variable is similar to the
normalized evidence variable x from our analysis using signal
detection theory, but is not the same as that variable since it is not
scaled in the units of its standard deviation.
As long as the activities of the two units stay above zero,
f z½yi ~yi, we can subtract Equation(5) from (4), yielding
dy~({lyzI)dtzedv: ð6Þ
In [1] it was observed that the above simplification can provide a
good approximation to the time evolution of the decision outcome
Figure 6. Reward bias is sub-optimal, especially at short delays. The observed reward bias, h’ (open circles connected with dotted lines) is
put together with the optimal bias h’ opt (diamonds with solid curves). Individual panels represent the individual results of the four participants
showing a reward bias.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g006
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above 0 during the early phases of the information accumulation
process (see also [4,21] and the discussion below for the effect of
nonlinearity). In this simplified model, often called the ‘one-
dimensional reduction’ of the LCA, the stimulus input I
corresponds to the difference between the two stimulus inputs
I1{I2. Without reward effects, it should be positive if stimulus 1 is
presented and negative otherwise. In accordance with the
approximately linear relationship between the stimulus level and
the asymptotic d’ noted in the Stimulus Sensitivity Analysis above, we
adopt the simplifying assumption that I is proportional to stimulus
level I~aS in our primary simulations. The value of the scalar a,
a free parameter of the model, corresponds to the participant’s
sensitivity to stimulus information. To distinguish this parameter
from the sensitivity for a specific stimulus condition, we call it
personal sensitivity. Noise ev results from the independent Gaussian
noise to the two accumulators so that e in the one dimensional
model is equal to
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
times the value of^ e e from the two dimensional
model. The term {ly results from the difference in the leak and
inhibition in the LCA model l~c{b.
This one dimension model in Equation (6) is well known as the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process in mathematics and physics,
and was first employed in a decision-making context by [26,27]. Its
linear form allows analytical solutions. Before the introduction of
reward bias, we follow the natural assumption that the
accumulation starts from a neutral state that is subject to trial-
to-trial variability. Mathematically, we treat the initial condition y0
as a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and initial variance
s2
0. Hence at any time the activation difference variable y follows a
Gaussian distribution with mean and variance
m(t)~
aS
l
(1{e{lt);s2(t)~s2
0e{2ltz
e2
2l
(1{e{2lt), ð7Þ
where I is replaced by aS and t denotes time. When connecting t
with response times in decision-making tasks, one should acknowl-
edge that it takes time before the stimulus information starts to accu-
mulate,as wellas to physicallyexecute the action [1,2]. We follow the
literature and use t{T0 to represent the duration of actual accumu-
lation process, with t representing total time relative to stimulus onset
and T0 representing the non-decision time just explained.
In general, the value ofthe activationdifferencevariable y reflects
the accumulated noisy signal in the system. The accumulated signal
strength is reflected in the mean of y and the accumulated noise
strength is reflected in its standard deviation, both of which change
over time. In the positive stimulus condition, the mean m(t)w0, and
when the corresponding negative stimulus is presented, the mean
m(t) takes the same absolute value but with a negative sign.
However, the standard deviation of the accumulated noise, s(t),h a s
the same pattern of growth in both cases. The Gaussian distribution
with mean m(t) and standard deviation s(t) represents the time
evolution of the distribution of the activation difference variable
across trials for a given stimulus condition. In a particular trial, the
activation difference variable is represented as a sample from this
distribution, and y(t)=s(t) corresponds to the normalized evidence
variable x as discussed in the Introduction. Given the assumption
that the choice will be positive if y(t)w0, the response probabilities
are uniquely determined by the ratio of the mean of the activation
difference variable to its standard deviation:
R(t)~
aS
l
(1{e{l(t{T0))
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s2
0e{2l(t{T0)z
e2
2l
(1{e{2l(t{T0))
r : ð8Þ
For a specific stimulus condition, for example when the stimulus is
shifted three-pixels to the right, this ratio measures the center
position of the distribution of the activation difference variable
relative to zero in the unit of its standard deviation. Since the mean
position of the corresponding opposite stimulus, three-pixel shifts to
the left, is the same distance away from zero in the opposite
direction, the variable R(t) corresponds to half of the stimulus
sensitivity d’(t) in Signal Detection Theory.
The stimulus sensitivity predicted by the O-U process above
also builds up and levels off with time (see Figure 7D and F),
similar to the delayed exponential function used in Stimulus
Sensitivity Analysis. The closeness of the approximation depends on
the value of s0, but the shifted exponential provides a good
approximation over a range of values of this parameter [1].
The time evolution of the distribution of the activation
difference variable y is sketched in Figure 7. We concentrate first
on panel A, which represents the time evolution for the case where
leak is greater than inhibition, so l is greater than 0. Here the
horizontal axis represents the value of the activation difference
variable, and the probability density of it having a particular value
is represented in the vertical dimension. Time is depicted moving
away from the observer. Red and blue denote two symmetrical
stimulus conditions: red for a positive stimulus and blue for the
corresponding negative stimulus. The center positions of the
distributions (represented by the thick blue and red lines shown on
the base plane of each plot) correspond to the mean of the
activation difference variable m(t) for trials of each type and the
width of each distribution represents its across-trial variability s(t).
As time goes on, the distributions broaden and diverge
symmetrically. Values of the distance between the two center
positions (green) and the width of the distributions (magenta) are
plotted in panel C, and the ratio between the two, d’(t) which
uniquely determines response probabilities, is plotted in panel D.
As previously noted, panel A of Figure 7 depicts the time
evolution of the variable when lw0. This corresponds to the case
where the leakage parameter c is larger than the inhibition
parameter b in the underlying two-dimensional LCA model.
When c is greater than b, so that lw0, we say the information
accumulation process is leak-dominant. As [1] noted, in leak-
dominance, as noisy information accumulates the effect of any
early input decays away. Hence at the decision time, the most
recent information plays a larger role.
A very different situation, inhibition-dominance, occurs when
inhibition is stronger than leak, so that lv0. In this situation,
whichever alternative has the lead at the beginning tends to
dominate and suppress its opponent through inhibition. Earlier
information is thus more important in the decision outcome. The
mean and the standard deviation of the activation difference
variable, although captured by the same equations Equation (7),
differ dramatically: they both reach asymptotic values with time in
leak-dominance (Figure 7 A), while they both explode to infinity in
inhibition-dominance (Figure 7 B). Remarkably, however, the
ratio between the two behaves in the same way in the two cases
(Figure 7 C and F). Intuitively, the reason for this is that the
absolute value of l affects the relative accumulation of stimulus
information compared to noise in the system. Response probabil-
ities are determined by the ratio between the accumulated signal
and accumulated noise, and it is this ratio that behaves the same in
the two cases. Indeed, with an appropriate substitution of
parameters, exactly the same response probability patterns can
be produced in leak- and inhibition-dominance, as discussed in
Supporting Information S2. As mentioned in the introduction,
however, behavioral evidence from other studies using similar
procedures supports the inhibition-dominant version of the LCA
Integration of Reward and Stimulus Information
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observation interval exerts a stronger influence on the decision
outcome than information coming later, consistent with inhibition-
dominance and not leak-dominance. Accordingly, we turn
attention to the inhibition-dominant version of the model, and
consider the effects of reward bias within this context. We
complete the theoretical framework by presenting the predictions
in leak-dominance in Supporting Information S3.
Inhibition-dominance is characterized by a negative l which
means the activation difference variable explodes with time
(Figure 7B and E). Clearly, this is physiologically unrealistic; neural
activity does not grow without bound. However, the explosion is
characteristic of the linear approximation to the two dimensional
LCA model, and does not occur in the full model itself [1]. In the
linear approximation, the explosion is a consequence of the mutual
inhibition among the accumulators: As the activation of one of the
accumulators goes negative, its influence on the other accumulator
becomesexcitatory(negativeactivation timesthe negative influence
results in positive input). However, in the full nonlinear LCA
model, when the activity of an accumulator reaches zero, it stops
sending any output. The effective inhibition of the other
accumulator then ceases, thereby putting that accumulator in a
leak-dominant regime, so that its activation tends to stabilize at a
positive activation value, while the activation of the other tends to
stabilize at a point below 0. (Physiologically, this would correspond
to suppression of the potential of the neuron, below the threshold
for emitting action potentials.)
The situation is illustrated in Figure 8A. Here, the dynamics and
the two stable equilibria are plotted for a case in which a positive
stimulus is presented, favoring accumulator 1. Typically, the
accumulators are thought of as being initialized at a point in the
upper right quadrant, but as shown in [21] there is a rapid
convergence onto the solid red diagonal line illustrated. This
diagonal line captures the dynamics of the difference between the
two accumulators, the activation difference variable y in Figure 8B.
Because of the positive input, most trials end in the equilibrium
with accumulator 1 active and accumulator 2 inactive (the red
point on the bottom right quadrant of the figure), but due to the
combined effects of noise in the starting place and in the
accumulation process, the network occasionally ends up in a state
where accumulator 2 is active and accumulator 1 is inactive (this is
the equilibrium point in the upper left quadrant of the figure). The
difference between the two accumulators thus diverges at first and
then stabilizes near one of two possible values. In the linear
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) approximation, the difference variable
explodes to either positive or negative infinity, as illustrated
schematically in Figure 8B. But, since the decision outcome
depends on the sign of the difference variable, the linear
approximation captures the same decision outcomes as the full
nonlinear model, as long as parameters are such that neither
activation goes below 0 too early [1,21].
Panel C of Figure 8 shows the time evolution of the difference
between the two accumulators in the full nonlinear LCA model
when the positive stimulus is presented as in panel A. The
probability of choosing alternative 1 is indicated by the area under
the red surface that falls to the right of the black vertical separating
plane at 0. With nonlinearity, the distribution exhibits major and
minor concentrations corresponding to the two attracting
Figure 7. Time evolution of the activation difference variable y in the reduced leaky competing accumulator model. Top panels:
probability density functions of the activation difference variable in leak- (panel A) and inhibition-dominance (panel B). See text for details. At a given
time point, the variable is described by a Gaussian distribution (red distribution for a positive stimulus condition and blue for the corresponding
negative stimulus). The center position of each distribution (red and blue solid lines on the bottom) represents the mean of the activation difference
variable m(t) and each distribution’s width represents the standard deviation s(t). As time goes on, the two distributions broaden and diverge
following the dynamics in Equation (7). The distance between them normalized by their width correspond to the stimulus sensitivity d’(t), which
uniquely determines response probabilities when the decision criterion is zero (vertical black plane). In leak-dominance, the distance between the
two distributions and their width (green and magenta lines respectively in panel C) both level off at asymptotic values. In contrast, they both explode
in inhibition-dominance (panel E). However, the ratio between the two behaves in the same way (panel D and F). Note: In panels C–F, the T0 point on
the x-axis corresponds to the time at which the stimulus information first begins to affect the accumulators. The flat portion of each curve before that
time simply illustrates the starting value at time T0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g007
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Instead, the distribution flattens out quickly and its center moves
quickly as well (See Figure 7 panel B). However, the areas under
the two distributions to the right of the dividing plane can be the
same.
Because the one-dimensional O-U approximation allows
analytic solutions we use it as a first step in modeling the data.
We then present simulations using the full LCAi model to confirm
that the results are indeed consistent with the underlying model
itself, and not only with its one-dimensional approximation.
Formal Analysis of The Hypotheses for the Effects of
Reward
When unbalanced reward is introduced into the LCAi
framework, the hypotheses stated in the Introduction can be
specified as follows. Under the ongoing input hypothesis, HOI,
influences of both reward and stimulus accumulate in the same
way, so that reward affects the input term I, albeit starting before
the onset of the stimulus. Under the initial condition hypothesis, HIC,
reward information offsets the state of the activation difference
variable at the time when stimulus information begins to
accumulate, perhaps due to a transitory input ending before the
stimulus. Under the fixed offset hypothesis, HFO, reward information
biases decision-making independently of the processes that affect
the accumulation of stimulus information. It offsets the activation
difference variable by a fixed amount favoring the high reward
alternative, or equivalently, it offsets the decision criterion applied
to this variable by a fixed amount in the opposite direction. With
the help of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model, the effect of the reward
on the activation difference variable at any time can be quantified
under each of these three hypotheses. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the higher reward is associated with alternative 1,
or the positive alternative. So in all hypotheses, the unbalanced
reward shifts the activation difference variable in the positive
direction relative to the decision criterion in all stimulus
conditions.
The ongoing input hypothesis, HOI, treats reward as an input Ir on
top of the stimulus input that drives the accumulator. In the full
two-accumulator LCA model, this could correspond to an
additional input to the higher reward unit resulting in the new
input term in the O-U process: I~aSzIr. By inserting this to
Equation (6), we obtain the new solution for the mean of the
activation difference variable
m(t)~
aS
l
(1{e{l(t{T0))z
Ir
l
(1{e{l(t{T0z0:75)), ð9Þ
where t denotes time relative to the stimulus onset. Note that the
non-decision time T0 is included in order to match the prediction
with response times in the experiment. Comparing this solution
with the m(t) term in Equation (7), one can notice the addition of
an independent reward term which grows in the same way as the
stimulus. Intuitively, in this hypothesis the activation difference
variable is shifted towards the higher reward by an amount that
builds up with time. Because the reward cue comes on 750 ms
before the stimulus, the reward effect is already present to some
extent at stimulus onset (note the additional time 0:75 in the
reward term), although it will continue to build up further as time
continues. The overall strength of reward bias is controlled by free
parameter Ir.
The initial condition hypothesis, HIC, assumes that reward
information affects the initial condition or starting point of the
process by the amount Yr. In the full framework of the LCA
model, this could result from a higher starting point of
accumulator 1, or a lower starting point of accumulator 2,o r
both. This hypothesis differs from the first one in that reward
information enters the accumulation process only at or before the
stimulus onset. Mechanistically the reward effect can be thought of
as having been subject to integration before the stimulus onset with
the integration terminating when the stimulus turns on, or possibly
before that time. This effect then follows the dynamics of the
system in this hypothesis. Mathematically, the mean of the
activation difference variable is changed to
m(t)~
aS
l
(1{e{l(t{T0))zYre{l(t{T0), ð10Þ
where the dynamic effect of the reward is represented by
Yre{l(t{T0). The value of the parameter Yr denotes the overall
strength of the reward effect.
Figure 8. Effect of nonlinearity on the dynamics of the activation difference variable and on response probabilities. Only the case of a
positive stimulus is drawn. Left column: phase planes of the full nonlinear leaky competing accumulator model (panel A) and the linear O-U
approximation (panel B). In panel A, a point on the y1,y2 plane represents the two activation variables whose values are read out from the horizonal
and vertical axes. The time evolution of the two variables is described by the trace of the point. They explode first until they are out of the first
quadrant and then converge to one of the two attracting equilibria. In panel B, the activation difference variable y explodes to either {? or z?.
The dashed line in panel A denotes the boundary of the basins of attraction. In the one-dimensional space in panel B, the boundary is denoted by the
red dot. Panel C: the probability density function (PDF) of y1{y2 based on the full nonlinear LCA. Panel format is as in Figure 7. Panel D: the PDF at
the end of the time interval simulated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g008
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independently of the sensory accumulation process. The reward
effect is therefore treated as a constant offset of the activation
difference variable whose mean value is changed to:
m(t)~
aS
l
(1{e{l(t{T0))zCr: ð11Þ
According to this hypothesis, the accumulators only accumulate
evidence from the stimulus, and the reward information is
essentially processed separately, without interacting with the
dynamics of stimulus integration. This is quite different from the
situation in the other two hypotheses, where decisions are
completely determined by the activity of the accumulator, and
reward and stimulus both influence the processing dynamics.
So far, we have quantified the reward effect on the mean of the
activation difference variable averaged across trials m(t). However,
response probability is determined by variability s(t) as well as by
the mean, as previously discussed. One source of noise is
variability in the initial state of the activation difference variable,
with standard deviation s0. The other source is the noise intrinsic
to the dynamics of the process itself, with standard deviation e.
The absolute noise level is not measurable in the current experiment
because response probability results from the signal to noise ratio.
For this reason, we can fix the strength of the intrinsic noise at a
specific value, and we set e~1 without loss of generality. The fitted
values for other free parameters can therefore be viewed as relative
to the value of the intrinsic noise level e.
We now summarize the predictions of the three hypotheses on
response probabilities. The probability of choosing the higher
reward is determined by the ratio between the mean and the
standard deviation of the activation difference variable, which
both evolve with time. Thanks to the linearity of the O-U model, it
is a linear combination of a stimulus term and a reward term.
These hypotheses share the same stimulus term, Equation (8), and
they have their unique reward terms
HOI :
Ir
l
(1{e{l(t{T0z0:75))
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s2
0e{2l(t{T0)z
1
2l
(1{e{2l(t{T0))
r ; ð12Þ
HIC :
Yre{l(t{T0)
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0e{2l(t{T0)z
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2l
(1{e{2l(t{T0))
r : ð14Þ
To see how these hypotheses predict response probabilities as
shown in Figure 3, one simply needs to assign values of S and t to
the prediction of a hypothesis, where S refers to the stimulus level
and t refers to the time of a response since stimulus onset. For
example, to see the prediction of the ongoing input hypothesis, in
the condition of 3 pixels shifted towards the higher reward and
responses occurring 500 ms after stimulus onset, one should assign
S~z3,t~0:5 to Equation (8) and Equation (12) to obtain the
response probability. The predicted values should be compared
with a data point in the corresponding condition in Figure 3 to
evaluate the hypothesis. To fit the model to the individual
participant data, there are five free parameters that must be fit for
each participant. Four of them are shared across the three
hypotheses: l which determines the dynamics of the system (the
sign of l determines whether the process is leak or inhibition-
dominant, and its absolute value determines how long the process
takes to stabilize); a, which characterizes the participant’s personal
stimulus sensitivity; s0 denoting the variability in the initial
condition; T0, the non-decision time in the task which includes the
time it takes before the information arrives at the accumulators
and the time for action execution. The fifth parameter is the
hypothesis dependent parameter expressing the effect of reward
information. In HOI, it represents the reward input strength Ir;i n
HIC it represents the magnitude of the reward-based offset to the
initial condition, Yr; and in HFO, it represents the magnitude of
the fixed offset Cr.
Test Results on the Hypotheses
The predictions of the three hypotheses are depicted in Figure 9,
with each column representing those of each hypothesis. As
emphasized before, the analysis focuses on the inhibition-
dominant regime in which lv0. The time evolution of the
activation difference variable y is summarized in the top row. As in
Figure 7B, red and blue denote the condition of the positive and
negative stimulus respectively. The width of the distributions
convey the variability of the activation difference variable, and
their center positions, marked by solid red and blue lines below the
distributions, indicate their mean values.
Without reward, the distributions are symmetrical (Figure 7B).
With a reward influence in place, an overall asymmetry is
introduced, corresponding to the reward effect – the time-
evolution of the mean reward effect is indicated by the green
curve in each panel of the top row of Figure 9. The effect of
reward bias on response probability at a given time t depends on
the reward effect on the normalized decision variable, corre-
sponding to the mean of the activation difference divided by its
standard deviation. The panels in the middle row show the mean
reward effect and the standard deviation of the activation
difference variable in green and magenta respectively. The ratio
between the two, which represents the qualitative pattern of the
normalized reward-bias on response probabilities under each of
the three hypotheses, is sketched in the bottom row of the figure
and summarized in Equations (12, 13, and 14).
With these figures in front of us, let us now consider the three
hypotheses. They all make predictions that are in some ways
similar, in that the effect of reward bias starts at a fairly high but
finite value, and then drops gradually with time. Focusing first on
the starting place and initial drop, these effects arise as follows. Just
at the instant that the stimulus effect is about to begin to influence
the accumulators (t{To~0), all three hypotheses express the state
of the reward bias as a simple ratio of the size of the reward bias
that is in effect at that time, divided by the initial variability. In the
idealized situation in which there were no such initial variability,
then, participants could show the idealized and optimal initial bias,
that is, they would always choose the alternative associated with
the larger reward. If some initial variability is inevitable, then it is
the ratio of the initial bias to the magnitude of this variability that
determines how large the reward bias will be. The subsequent
drop in the magnitude of the reward bias then reflects, in part, the
increase in the overall variance – this increase is the same under all
three hypotheses, as illustrated in the middle panels of the figure.
As previously discussed, any variability in the activation difference
variable at the outset of processing grows exponentially, without
limit. This causes the widening and flattening of the distributions
in the top row of Figure 9. What differs across the three hypotheses
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Equations 12–13) changes as time goes onward.
HFO: reward as a fixed offset in the value of the activation difference
variable. Under this hypothesis, the reward introduces a fixed offset
in the activation difference variable, so that the effect of the reward
on the mean of the activation difference variable remains constant
over time (green solid line in the middle right panel). Given the
increasing variance, the reward effect on choices thus weakens
with time when scaled against the accumulated noise. Therefore,
the reward effect on response probabilities disappears as stimulus
duration lengthens (see bottom right panel in Figure 9). Reviewing
Figure 6, we see that the reward bias sustains for long response
times. Thus, HFO is inconsistent with the data from the
participants.
HOI vs HIC: reward information participates in processing dynamics.
Under both of the remaining hypotheses, the reward effect on the
mean of the activation difference variable grows without limit, but
it does so more aggressively in the case where the reward is
assumed to provide an ongoing source of input to the
accumulators (HOI, green curve in the middle left panel) than in
the case where the reward input only affects the initial conditions
of the accumulators (HIC, green curve in the middle center panel).
At first, under both hypotheses, the dynamics of the normalized
decision criterion (i.e. the reward bias in the bottom left and center
panels) is more affected by the growth of the denominator, causing
the ratio to decline. As time elapses, however, the growth of the
reward effect under HOI exceeds that of the accumulated noise.
The resulting ratio hence starts to grow again. Quantitatively,
we can take the derivative of the reward bias with respect
to time which indicates that the turn-over occurs at time
t~0:75zT0zlog(1{2ls2
0)=l. From this we can see that
stronger initial variability is associated with an earlier minimum
in the value of the normalized reward bias. A similar growing-
declining pattern on accuracy was noticed in [28] with dynamical
signal strength in the drift diffusion model. The data in Figure 6
indicates that none of the participants exhibited this pattern.
Therefore, we conclude that HOI is qualitatively inconsistent with
the observed experimental data.
The pattern that we observe under the initial condition
hypothesis HIC is consistent with the data. In this case, the
reward effect on the activation difference variable grows
exponentially with time, but it grows more slowly than in HOI,
because there is no continuing driving input behind it. The
resulting reward bias on choice decreases monotonically with time
and levels off, as shown in the bottom middle panel of the figure.
Quantitatively, this asymptotic value is equal to Yr=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s2
0{1=2l
q
.
Quantitative Fit Based on HIC
Based on the qualitative superiority of HIC, we proceeded to
investigate whether a good quantitative fit to the individual
participant data could be obtained under this hypothesis. To do
so, we assign values of the stimulus and time to obtain the predicted
response probabilities described by Equations(8) and (13). Please
see the example below Equation(14). The stimulus takes value of 1,3
or 5 according to the experiment. The value of time is the mean
reaction time of the participant in a specific experiment condition,
defined by the averaged time of the response relative to the
stimulus onset. The parameters that were allowed to vary in fitting
the data from individual participants were the net inhibition
parameter l (forced to be negative, in line with the inhibition-
Figure 9. Reward effects in the three hypotheses based on the reduced leaky competing accumulator model. Figure format is similar to
that in Figure 7. Top panels: time evolution of distributions of the activation difference variable y in inhibition-dominance for the positive (red) and
negative (blue) stimulus conditions. Solid red, blue and green lines present the mean positions of the positive, negative distributions and the two
distributions combined respectively. Middle panels: time evolution of the mean position of the distributions (green lines, as in the top panel) and the
standard deviations of these distributions (magenta). Bottom panels: the ratio between the two, which represents the reward bias on the normalized
decision variable corresponding to the reward bias in Figure 6. Left column: HOI, in which reward information provides an ongoing input to the
accumulator. Conventions for the x axis in the middle and bottom panels are as in Figure 7. Note that reward cue comes on before the stimulus in the
experiment so some reward effect is already present at the stimulus onset. Middle column: HIC, in which reward offsets the initial condition. Right
column: HFO, in which reward offsets the activation variable y by a fixed amount. Note that under HOI, the effect of reward bias on choice grows
with time in long delay conditions (bottom left); under HFO it disappears as stimulus duration lengthens (bottom right); under HIC, the effect of
reward decreases to a fixed value greater than 0 as accuracy reaches asymptote.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g009
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bias strength Yr, initial variability s0, and non-decision time T0.
We found values for these parameters that jointly maximize the
likelihood of the data, using the MATLAB optimization tool
fminsearch which finds local minima using the Nelder-Mead simplex
algorithm. 50 searches were run for each participant to identify
multiple minima and the result with the highest data likelihood
was selected.
As before, the intrinsic incoming noise strength e was held
constant at 1.0. Parameters a,Yr and s0, which reflect the
activation of the accumulators or their growing rate, are therefore
normalized by the noise strength and do not have units. Values of
T0 are in seconds and of l in 1=sec. The maximum likelihood values
of the parameters are shown in Table 2, and the expected
behavioral choice results are displayed in Figure 10. This
hypothesis captures all four of the important qualitative features
of the data itemized in the section on Basic Findings.
The correspondence between the experimental data and the
model is generally quite close for all four participants. However,
there are slight deviations from the fitted values for all four
participants. We asked whether the deviation between the data
and the model is greater than we would expect by chance by
generating 1000 simulated data sets from the predicted response
probabilities given by the model, calculating the log likelihood of
each such simulated data set, and comparing the value of the log
likelihood for the participant’s actual data to the distribution of
values obtained with the simulated data sets. These simulated
values for each participant form unimodal and approximately
normal distributions. For two of the participants (CM and JA), the
obtained log likelihood falls well within the distribution of values
generated by the stochastic simulation (56% and 78% of the
simulated values fall below the values for CM and JA respectively).
What this means is that, for these two participants, the data are as
consistent with the model as we would expect if the model actually
generated the data. For the other two participants (MJ and ZA),
however, the obtained log likelihood values fall in the tail (below all
but 5% and 1% of the simulated values, respectively), suggesting
that there may be a real, though subtle, discrepancy between the
model and the experimental data. Examination of the relationship
between the expected and predicted values in Figure 10 suggests
that in the case of participant ZA, the model may be systematically
overstating the degree of reward bias in the hardest stimulus
conditions (for longer delays, the actual data points for both +1
and 21 conditions tend to fall below the fitted curves for this
participant). The pattern of deviations in the case of participant
MJ are more scattered, and do not appear to be systematic. We
explored the possibility that a better fit to the data for MJ and ZA
could be obtained by relaxing the simplifying assumption that the
asymptotic sensitivity levels D’ is a linear function of the stimulus
level S. This idea seemed worth exploring because, as can be seen
in Table 1 and Figure 5, the approximation seems less adequate
for these participants than for the others. However, using the three
fitted values of D’ directly, instead of the linear approximation to
the relation between D’ and S, only resulted in a slight
improvement in both cases (actual log likelihood values still fall
below all but 9% and 5% of simulated values based on the direct
D’ fits for MJ and ZA respectively), and makes the pattern of
deviation described in the text for ZA appear even more clearly.
Even if there is room for further improvement in the case of
participant ZA, the overall fit of the model to the pattern of the
data from all four participants indicates that the model can capture
nearly all of the systematic structure in the data.
Reward Offset in the Full Nonlinear Leaky Competing
Accumulator Model
Before we finalize our assessment of the account we have offered
for our data, we must revisit the effect of nonlinearity in the full
leaky competing accumulator model. To address this we
conducted a further fitting exercise using the full LCA. We
constrained the parameter values for this fit based on those in the
reduced Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model in Table 2. As explained
above, the single variable in O-U results from the difference
between the two activation variables in the LCA: y~y1{y2,
l~c{b,aS~i1{i2 and e~
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
^ e e. With this relationship, we only
have two more free parameters: c and a baseline input B. With
them, we can specify the strength of the mutual inhibition b since
b~c{l, as well as the inputs to the two accumulators:
i1~BzaS=2 and i2~B{aS=2. For this simulation, we initialize
each of the two accumulators with independent Gaussian random
values drawn from distributions with the same mean value
B=(czb) and standard deviation s0=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
. Then, we add half of
the initial reward offset amount (Yr=2) to the first accumulator and
subtract this quantity from the second accumulator. Effectively the
difference between the two activation variables at the moment
stimulus information starts to affect them has a mean of Yr and a
standard deviation of s0. This initial condition corresponds to a
two-dimensional Gaussian distribution whose mean falls on the
negative diagonal line shown in Figure 8A, shifted along this line
toward the direction of higher reward. We then explored possible
values of the two remaining free parameters to find values that
would allow a good fit to the data.
The chosen values of the parameters are shown in Table 3.
Although the parameter b is not independent of other parameters,
we show its value in the table as well. Since analytical prediction of
response probability is not possible due to the nonlinearity, the
values are chosen according to stochastic simulation. For each
delay and stimulus condition, we ran 2000 simulated trials. The
simulated response probabilities in all the conditions were then
treated as the prediction of the model associated with a parameter
set. We then searched for a parameter set to maximize the
likelihood of the data. These simulations are themselves subject to
noise, and there is no guarantee that the best values we found are
the best possible values. In fact, similarly good fits can be obtained
with other values, as we should expect given previous results
demonstrating the adequacy of the one dimensional projection of
the model to mimic predictions of the full two dimensional
modelUsher2001,Bogacz2006. For given values of the other
parameters, the parameter B influences the correspondence
Table 2. Parameter values in fitting the reduced LCA.
Participant l aY r s0 T0 log(p)
CM 23.4 0.35 0.23 0.21 0.35 2192
JA 21.6 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.32 2198
MJ 25.1 0.43 0.10 0.16 0.35 2223
ZA 23.9 0.52 0.16 0.11 0.36 2199
Fitted parameters of the linear approximation (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck) of the leaky
competing accumulator model in the inhibition-dominant regime under the
initial condition hypothesis HIC. Each row represents the results for each of the
four participants who show a reward bias. The model is explained in the main
text and summarized in Equations (6, 8, 10, 13). The absolute value of l is
inversely related to the time scale of the decision-making process and the
minus sign means the process is in inhibition-dominance. a,Yr,s0 and T0
denote a participant’s personal sensitivity to the stimulus, the overall strength
of the reward bias, the level of the initial variability and the non-decision time
respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.t002
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When B is very large, the correspondence becomes perfect, because
both accumulators’ activation values stay above 0. As B decreases to
the point where B=(czb)v0:5, we begin to find subtle effects,
whereby occasionally, trials that initially reached the wrong
attractor can bounce out of it due to noise, improving accuracy.
A subtle effect of this kind may be affecting the simulation results for
participants MJ and ZA, but the effect is too small to produce a
noticeable improvement in the overall goodness of fit.
The expected response probability patterns for each of the
participants are plotted in Figure 11 together with the data.
Evidently, with the chosen values of the 2 additional parameters,
the full two dimensional model fits the experimental data in a way
that is very similar to the fit provided by the reduced model.
Overall, it appears that HIC, in which reward offsets the initial
condition of the decision process, provides a very good account of
the observed data.
Discussion
In this work, we attempted to answer the question: How do
humans integrate reward and stimulus information dynamically in
perceptual decision-making? We used a perceptual decision-
making task with unbalanced rewards in which stimulus duration
varied from 0 to 2000 ms. We found that, for four of the five
participants in the experiment, reward bias, measured in terms of
the position of the normalized decision criterion h’, starts high
initially and declines as stimulus sensitivity builds up, then levels off
as stimulus sensitivity reaches asymptotic levels.
We find that the detailed pattern of results can be captured by
the inhibition-dominant leaky competing accumulator model
(LCA), under the assumption that reward offsets the initial state
of the accumulators before stimulus information begins to
accumulate. In the inhibition-dominant regime, the accumulator
that has an initial lead in activation tends to suppress the other
accumulator. The advantage thereby granted by the reward
difference to the accumulator associated with the higher reward
actually builds up over time, although it lessens in a relative sense
as time goes on since variability builds up even more quickly
initially. The model explains how an imbalance in the initial
activation of the two accumulators can produce a monotonically
decreasing shift in the position of the normalized decision
criterion, as seen in the data, in terms of the relative rates of
growth of the reward offset signal and the total accumulated noise.
It is worth noting that our analysis revealed that the three different
accounts of the way in which reward might affect the information
integration process each has its own qualitatively distinct empirical
signature. Thus, we were able to rule out two of the three
hypotheses by relying on the qualitative form of the data. Focusing
on the remaining hypothesis, we found it to provide not only a
match to the qualitative pattern of the data but also to allow a
close fit of the exact quantitative pattern in the data as well.
Our use of the inhibition-dominant LCA is not strictly required
by the present data – these data could be fit by a leak-dominant
variant of the model equally well (See Appendices 2 and 3). Our
choice to pursue the inhibition-dominant regime is not arbitrary,
however. It is based on findings of other recent studies using
similar paradigms, in which humans or primates must be prepared
to respond quickly to an imperative go cue or response signal, as
they must in our experiment. The inhibition-dominant LCA
simultaneously explains (a) why accuracy levels off at non-ceiling
levels as stimulus processing time increases, and (b) why
Table 3. Parameter values in fitting the full nonlinear LCA.
Participant ª B
CM 1.8 5.3
JA 0.4 1.5
MJ 0.7 2.1
ZA 0.5 2.0
Leak c and the baseline input B in the full nonlinear leaky competing
accumulator model. Based on these parameters and the parameters from the
reduced model (Table 2), we can obtain the inhibition strength b~c{l and the
inputs to the two accumulators B+aS=2 where S~1,3,5 refers to the stimulus
levels. See Equations (4–5) and the main text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.t003
Figure 10. Fitting results under the hypothesis that reward affects the initial conditions of the evidence accumulation process (HIC),
based on the reduced leaky competing accumulator model. Solid curves denote fitting results and symbols denote data as shown in Figure 3.
Red, green and blue denote high, intermediate and low discriminability levels respectively. See Table 2 for fitted parameters and log likelihoods.
Fitting is based on the one dimensional linear approximation (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck) of the leaky competing accumulator model, see Equation (6).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g010
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decision outcomes than information coming later [22,23].
Alternative Models
While the model offers an excellent fit to the data, this does not
necessarily preclude the possibility that other approaches might
also be able to explain the present data. Future research will be
needed to examine the full range of possible alternative models.
Here we briefly consider whether our results can be explained
within the classic drift diffusion model.
The first point to note is that the drift-diffusion model, in its
simplest form (no between trial drift variance and no bound in the
integration of information) predicts that accuracy will continue to
grow without limit, something that is not observed in this or other
experiments. The leveling off of accuracy as a function of
processing time can be explained by assuming there is trial-to-
trial variability in the driving input to the evidence accumulation
process [2]. While such an approach can provide a good fit to our
stimulus sensitivity data, it is not consistent with the pattern of
reward bias effects we observe under any of the hypotheses we
have considered. Under either the initial condition hypothesis HIC
or the fixed offset hypothesis HFO the effect of the reward bias will
eventually become negligible, because the variance of the evidence
accumulation process increases without limit. Under the ongoing
input hypothesis HOI, in which the reward input starts with
reward cue onset and continues until the response choice is
initiated, it is possible to capture a large initial bias that reduces as
accuracy grows and then levels off. However, according to such a
model, the fit is constrained by the fact that the normalized reward
bias and the stimulus sensitivity have the same dynamics except
that reward starts 0:75 second earlier. For example, in order to
prevent the stimulus sensitivity from saturating too early, the main
source of noise should be within-trial variability. However, this
results in a dip in the normalized reward bias curve as in HOI in
the LCAi framework. Due to these constraints, the fit to the data is
poorer than the fit to the LCAi for all four participants (log-
likelihood values are {204,{215,{352,{369 for CM, MJ, JA,
and ZA, respectively; fits were obtained using an unbounded drift
diffusion model with free parameters for sensitivity a, overall
reward strength b, between-trial drift variability sb, starting point
variability s0, and dead-time parameter T0, amounting to the
same number of free parameters as the LCAi).
We considered the further possibility that the imposition of a
bound on the integration process might allow the DDM to account
for our data, since it has been argued that participants may reach a
integration bound before the go cue occurs [22]. However,
inclusion of a bound tends to compromise the fit to the sensitivity
data: the presence of the bound tends to cause d’ to asymptote
earlier for easy trials and later for hard trials, contra the pattern in
the data. It remains possible that some version of the drift diffusion
model could account for the data. We leave it to others to explore
this possibility further.
Our findings on the effects of reward bias are largely consistent
with, but also extend, other recent studies of the role of reward in
the dynamics of decision-making. Previous human behavioral
studies [12,13] also rejected the idea that reward bias acts as a
continuing input to the state of the accumulators during
accumulation of stimulus information, and supported a two-stage
model, similar to ours in some ways, in which processing of reward
cues preceded, and set the initial state, of the evidence variable
prior to the start of stimulus processing (for further consideration
of this model, see future directions below). Neurophysiological data
from [15] likewise supports the view that reward cues affect the
starting point of an information accumulation process in a
paradigm somewhat similar to ours, albeit one with a fixed
stimulus duration. Neither study explored as wide a range of
processing times as the present study, and in consequence, neither
study showed clearly that reward bias effects decrease but level off
at nonzero levels as processing continues.
Consistent with findings in [14], for the four participants who
showed reward bias effects, the amount of bias is close to optimal
when stimulus duration is long, deviating slightly and with
relatively little cost in the under-biased direction. In contrast,
when they have zero sensitivity to the stimulus at very short delays,
all participants deviate from the optimal strategy of always
choosing the alternative associated with the higher reward. We
should also note that one of the five participants in the study failed
to exhibit a systematic reward bias. We have occasionally seen this
pattern in other participants tested on variants of the task used
here, and the finding is reminiscent of the finding in the study of
Diederich and Busemeyer [13], in which there was a group of
participants who showed little or no sensitivity to their reward
manipulation. We have sometimes found that participants could
be induced to show reward bias effects through persistent
Figure 11. Fitting results under the initial condition hypothesis HIC, based on the full nonlinear leaky competing accumulator
model. Figure format is as in Figure 10. See Table 3 for fitted parameters.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g011
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information when stimulus information is uncertain, but we did
not employ this approach in the present investigation.
Explaining the Initial Underbias in Choice Responses
Can our model help explain why participants do not always
choose the higher reward alternative at short processing times,
where performance shows no stimulus sensitivity? In the model,
one factor that limits the size of the initial reward bias is initial
variability in the activations of the accumulators (see Figure 12).
This initial variability may reflect a carry over or compensation for
previous trials [29], and it can also reflect noise accumulated
within a trial before stimulus onset. The variability could also arise
from trial-to-trial fluctuation in the magnitude of the reward offset
signal. For the same amount of mean offset in the activation
difference variable due to reward, the resulting effect on response
probability is strongly affected by this initial variability. Indeed, if
the initial variability were 0, even a very slight initial reward bias
would always lead to a choice of the higher reward alternative in
our model.
The initial variability, as well as other parameters associated
with each individual participant’s performance, might be viewed
as inherent in the decision process – factors the participant has
little or no ability to control. However, even if the amount of initial
variability and these other parameters were fixed, a decision maker
could still come closer to achieving an optimal bias on short trials
by offsetting the activation difference variable by an even larger
amount. Assuming participants have strategic control over the
magnitude of this initial bias, the question then arises, why do they
not simply make the initial bias even stronger?
One response to this question is to note that if participants offset
the starting point of the accumulation process by too much, this
may produce an over-bias on trials where the stimulus duration
turns out to be very long. To investigate this, we can examine, for
each participant, the expected rewards for different delays, and for
the average over delays, as the magnitude of the initial reward
offset increases (Figure 13), holding all other parameters of the
decision process constant. The amount of offset that maximizes
reward in the longest delay condition (the vertical green bar on the
top of the green curve) is plotted together with the amount of offset
each participant used (vertical blue line), according to the fitted
value of the reward offset parameter in the one dimensional
reduction of the model. Also shown (vertical black bar on top of
the black curve) is the amount of bias that will optimize reward
overall. This plot demonstrates that the actual bias is close to
optimal for longer delays, but that all participants will gain more
rewards overall by starting each trial with a larger reward offset.
Why participants do not fully optimize the magnitude of their
reward bias is a question that cannot be fully resolved by the
present study. However, it may be worth considering a few
possibilities. One possible reason could be that participants’
subjective utility is a decreasing function of the objective rewards
[30,31]. The desirability of winning 2 points may be less than
twice that of winning 1 point, or alternatively, observers may place
some intrinsic value C on being correct, independent of the
reward, such that the subjective reward ratio becomes
(RHzC)=(RLzC); this quantity is always less than RH=RL as
long as C is positive. See also [32] and references therein. Another
possibility is that setting a large initial offset in the accumulators
requires effort, and participants are trading off a small amount of
their possible payoff for a reduction of this effort. In this
connection it is worth noting that all four of the participants
who showed reward effects are achieving within 5% of their
maximum possible reward in the longest delay condition (as
indicated by the horizontal dashed lines on each panel of
Figure 13). Thus, even if the extra effort required were only
moderate, the benefits might not be worth it. This is due to the
shallow curvature of the reward harvesting curves, especially for
Figure 12. The magnitude of the effect of reward bias is affected by the initial variability. The same reward offset (center position of the
distributions relative to 0) results in choosing the higher reward alternative almost 100% of the time when the variability in the activation difference
variable is very low (blue); while this occurs much less often (about 65% of the time in the case illustrated) when the variability is high (red).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g012
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reported in the free response protocol with the drift diffusion
model [33].
Beyond these possibilities, there are other kinds of reasons why
participants might not adopt a larger reward offset: One possibility
that is of interest from the point of view of models like the LCA is
that too large a reward offset would distort the dynamics of the
information integration process. As things stand, according to the
analysis offered by our model, the dynamics of the decision-
making process are effectively linear, in the sense that the linear
approximation offered by the one dimensional simplified model
provides a close fit to the data. A larger offset might push the
dynamics of the process outside of the region where this
approximation holds, and into a regime where the nonlinearity
in the process would lead to deviations from optimality. A further
possibility is that there are nonlinearities at the upper end of the
activation range not fully captured in either version of our model,
but present in more biologically realistic models [7], and that these
would come into play with strong initial reward biases. Also, if we
view the accumulators in the model as neural populations that
actually trigger overt responses when their activation reaches a
critical level (as the squeeze of a trigger causes a gun to fire), then
too much activation of an accumulator might actually trigger overt
responding prematurely. In that case, participants would have to
limit the magnitude of the initial activation of the more highly
rewarded alternative. As previously noted, selection among these
possibilities is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Open Questions and Future Directions
Here we consider several further issues that remain open and
discusssomepossibledirectionsforfurtherresearchon thesematters.
We have provided an account for the role of reward bias in a
particularparadigm,and theaccount providesquitea good fit tothe
data from all four participants. There may be room for further
improvement, however, in the adequacy of the fit in two of the four
cases. One obvious question is to explore how other models would
fare in fitting these data, and also to investigate whether an even
better fit might be achieved within the LCAi framework. In
examining the pattern of deviations from the fit offered by the
current version of the inhibition-dominant leaky competing
accumulator (LCAi) model, we see little clear pattern in the case
of participant MJ, and so are uncertain whether a closer fit will be
possible with any parsimonious model. In the case of participant
ZA, however, the deviations appear to reflect a slight under-
representation, on the part of the model, of the degree of reward
bias in the hardest stimulus condition (both blue curves fall above
most of the corresponding data points). Otherwise, the fit appears to
capture other features of the data quite accurately. Whether a slight
adjustment of the current model, or some alternative model, is able
to capture this small but apparently systematic deviation is an issue
that should be explored in further research. More generally, we
welcome comparison of the account offered by the LCAi to other
possible approaches to capturing the overall pattern in the data.
Several broader questions, going beyond the details of our
specific experiment, also deserve to be examined in future studies.
One concerns how well the LCAi might explain the pattern of
data presented in the two studies mentioned earlier on reward bias
effects in a task that is similar to ours in many respects but relies on
a deadline procedure [12,13]. The models considered in those
papers did not include leakage or inhibition. Two models that
share with our model the assumption that reward affects the initial
state of the accumulators were considered in these papers,
although the modeling framework used could not distinguish
between an offset in the starting place of the accumulators per se vs.
an offset in decision criteria. (One of the models considered in both
[12,13]–the ‘two-stage’ model– is most naturally viewed as a
model in which the first (reward-processing) stage drives activation
of the accumulators, but it is still possible to think of this stage as
one that introduces a complementary adjustment in the position of
decision boundaries). Although some of the models considered
provided better fits to the data than others, there was still room for
improvement even for the best models considered. In light of this,
it will be interesting to see how well the LCAi may be able to
account for the data from these studies.
Reward effects might also be explored in a standard reaction
time experiment, in which no explicit time constraint on
processing is provided. In such experiments, participants are
usually thought to respond when the activation of one of the
detectors reaches a criterial activation level. In the absence of trial-
to-trial variability in the input to the accumulators, the optimal
policy in the classical diffusion model is to offset the starting point
of the accumulators (or equivalently, to offset the positions of the
decision boundaries) by a fixed amount. However, if there is trial
to trial variability in stimulus difficulty (either due to drift variance
or to a mixture of difficulty levels), a superior policy may be to
allow the amount of reward bias to gradually increase [34], or,
alternatively, to allow it to produce a gradual decrease in the
position of the decision boundaries. This will have the useful
consequence of leading to less reward bias for the easy conditions
(which will tend to reach a boundary early) compared to the
harder conditions (which will tend to reach the boundary later,
when the effect of the bias is greater). It will be interesting to see
whether participants are able to achieve near-optimal reward bias
effects under such conditions, and if so to understand how such
effects are implemented mechanistically.
Figure 13. Normalized expected rewards as a function of the
reward offset under the initial condition hypothesis. Expected
reward obtained in the shortest delay condition (red), the longest delay
condition (green) and all delay conditions (black) are plotted together.
In each condition, the amounts of reward are normalized by the
maximum rewards the participant can achieve in that condition or set
of conditions. In each panel, the vertical blue line denotes the observed
reward offset, the vertical green bar on top of the green curve indicates
the amount of reward offset that would optimize performance for the
longest duration and the vertical black bar on top of the black curve
denotes the amount of reward offset that maximizes the overall
expected rewards across all durations. Note that optimal reward offsets
are based on the fits of the model rather than on the data. See text for
details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g013
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basis of reward effects on the dynamics of decision-making. While
the Rorie et. al. study [15] provides important evidence on this
issue, in a paradigm that has many similarities with the one we
have used in these studies, it would be desirable to develop non-
invasive methods for use in human studies as well, preferably using
imaging modalities such as EEG and MEG with high temporal
resolution. Investigations of this type are currently in progress in
our laboratory.
Another important direction for future investigations is to
understand better the individual differences we see between
participants, and to discover ways in which participant’s
performance can be optimized. In the earlier part of this
discussion, we focused on optimization of the way in which the
reward bias influences the decision-making process, considering
other parameters as fixed, but it may be that other parameters of
the process are also subject to strategic control, and hence possible
optimization. Participants may have some control over the
variability in the initial state of the accumulators. For example,
they may be trying to anticipate which alternative will be
presented on a given trial, even though this is completely
randomly determined. Alternatively, participants may have some
control over the shared input to the two accumulators (the B
parameter in the full two dimensional model), and/or the balance
between leak and inhibition. These parameters might be affected
by top-down activation signals or by neuromodulatory processes
partially or completely under strategic control, or at least subject to
individual differences. Exploration of these possibilities will be an
important target of future investigations.
Conclusion
Our investigation has considered how reward information
affects decision dynamics under conditions of time pressure and
uncertainty, and we have found that all four of the participants
who exhibited sensitivity to reward information showed a pattern
of reward bias in which responses after very short processing times
exhibited a strong reward bias, which tapered off to a steady level
as stimulus sensitivity also approached an asymptotic level. A good
account of our data was provided by a variant of the leaky
competing accumulator model, in which reward offsets the starting
place of a competitive, inhibition-dominant, activation process.
Exploring this further within the model, the initial offset values
fitted to the data of all four reward-sensitive participants allowed
each of them to harvest more than 95% of possible rewards, fixing
all other parameters of the model. Additional research is needed to
determine why participants were not able to come even closer to
optimality. Further research is also needed to consider how well
our data might be explained by alternative models; to further
understand the role of reward in other paradigms in which
responses must be made quickly based on uncertain information;
to understand the neural basis of reward effects on decision-
making; to understand individual differences; and to explore the
Figure 14. Procedure of the perceptual decision-making task with unequal payoffs. The reward cue (a left or right pointing triangle)
indicates which choice, if correct, receives higher reward. Timing of the stages of the experiment is depicted on the bottom. The ‘‘Go’’ cue comes on
with a delay of 0,75,150, 225,300,450, 600,900,1200 or 2000 milliseconds. See text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016749.g014
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requiring the integration of reward and stimulus information can
be optimized.
Methods
The research on human participants reported herein was
approved by the Stanford University Institutional Review Board
(nonmedical subcommitte) under protocol #7029. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants.
The stimulus was displayed on a Dell LCD monitor at
128061024 resolution using the Psychophysics Toolbox v2.54
extensions of Matlab r2007a. All stimuli were light gray rectangles
on a darker gray background. On each trial, the rectangle was
longer to the left or right of the screen center by 1,3 or 5 pixels
over a basis of 300 pixels, resulting in a shift of the center by
0:5,1:5 or 2:5 pixels. Participants, seated approximately 2.5 feet
from the monitor, were asked to judge which side of the rectangle
was longer and to indicate their decision by pressing one of two
specified keys assigned to the left and right index fingers.
On each trial, participants saw a fixation cross for 900 ms. An
arrow then replaced the fixation cross for 250 ms, pointing either
left or right to indicate which of the two responses, if correct, would
lead to a 2-point reward. The other alternative was always
associated with a reward of one point. The arrow was then replaced
by the fixation cross, and a stimulus was displayed 500 ms later.
After the stimulus appeared, participants were instructed to hold
their response until they heard the ‘‘go’’ cue. The cue tone was
played 0 to 2000 ms after the appearance of the stimulus. There
were ten possible cue onset times within this range. Participants
were to respond within 250 ms of the onset of the go cue.
The stimulus disappeared after the response. Visual and
auditory feedback was given 750 ms after the go cue indicating
whether the response occurred within 250 ms, and (if so) whether
it was correct. If participants responded within 250 msec and
chose correctly, they heard a cash register sound (‘ka-ching!’) once
or twice, and earned either 1 or 2 points. A correct response in the
direction indicated by the arrow would earn two points, while a
correct response in the opposite direction would earn only one
point. Incorrect responses earned no points and were followed by
an error noise. Responses that occurred too early or too late also
received no points, and were followed by a different noise.
The total time allotted for feedback of any type was 1000 ms.
Participants were paid a base amount of USD$7:00 per session
and an additional amount equal to 0:33 cent per point earned. See
Figure 14.
Five participants who reported normal or correct-to-normal
vision and hearing were tested in one-hour sessions over several
weeks. In each session, all combinations of discriminability level (1,
3, 5 pixels longer to the left or right), reward (left- or rightward
arrow) and delay condition (‘‘go’’ cue occurring 0,75,150,225,
300,450,600,900,1200,2000 milliseconds after stimulus onset)
were presented in a pseudorandom manner. In each session,
participants completed 7 blocks of 126 trials. A self-timed break
occurred between blocks. For all participants, the first two sessions
in which they familiarized themselves with the task were ignored.
The total number of trials included in the reported analysis were
15120,18720,19200,15120,10920 for participants CM, JA, MJ,
ZA, and SL respectively.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 Here, we present the Iso-Criterion
analysis of the data. For each delay condition, we plot the stimulus
sensitivity and the decision criterion variable representing the
degree of reward bias individually for each of the three difficulty
levels. The results are generally consistent with the hypothesis that
the participants are adopting a common criterion for the three
difficulty levels within each delay condition.
(PDF)
Supporting Information S2 In the linear version of the leaky
competing accumulator model, exactly the same pattern of choice
behavior can be predicted in either leak- or inhibition-dominance
with proper parameter values. Here, we demonstrate this result
and show the relationship between the two parameter sets in the
two regimes.
(PDF)
Supporting Information S3 Here we consider how reward
might influence choice behavior in the leak-dominant regime of
the leaky competing accumulator model, examining the same
three hypotheses considered in the main text for the inhibition-
dominant regime. Although the data from the reported experi-
ment are treated as arising within the inhibition-dominant regime,
we include this analysis to complete the analysis of the full
theoretical framework.
(PDF)
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